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RECENT CASES
But the military was plentiful in Hawaii, and, primarily to ease the strain
on local police forces, military personnel arrested for civilian crimes were
usually turned over to the military authorities. This custom continued after
the War until the present day. Hence, there exists a possibility that if this
case occurred on the continental United States, it would never have arisen
since the civilian courts would have exercised immediate jurisdiction over
the accused. The potential consequences of the decision are staggering. Pos-
sibly as many as 500,000 courts-martial convictions could be, affected, and it
could change the military's control over its personnel while they are off-base.
46
It should be noted that the Court did not define the term "service-con-
nected;" accordingly, the decision will be subject to varying interpretations,
ranging from all crimes committed off-base, including crimes routinely han-
dled by the military, such as drunkenness, to crimes with almost identical
circumstances as the instant case. 47 Also of interest is whether or not the
decision will be applied retroactively. It remains for the future and for the
second wave of cases to reach the courts for these questions to be answered
and to see what direction the lower courts will take in their interpretation of
O'Callahan. Probably, as a matter of practicality and administrative feasibil-
ity, the courts will narrowly interpret O'Callakan to avoid being swamped
with future cases.
BRucE R. FENWICIC'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WARRANTLESS SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAW-
FUL ARREST MUST BE LIMITED TO AREA WITHIN SUSPECT'S CONTROL
Police officers went to the home of defendant, Chimel, with a warrant for
his arrest for burglarizing a coin shop. No search warrant had been issued. The
officers waited for his return and presented him with the arrest warrant. Not-
withstanding Chimel's objection, the officers searched his house. During the
search, under the direction of the police officers, Chimel's wife opened drawers
and moved the contents thereof so that the officers might view any items that
might have been taken during the burglary. The search included Chimel's three-
bedroom home, as well as his attic, garage and small workshop. After the search,
which lasted for more than forty-five minutes, the officers seized coins, medals
and tokens which were found in Chimel's home. At petitioner's subsequent trial
on two counts of burglary, the items taken from his house were admitted into
evidence against him over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally
seized, and he was convicted. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by both
the California District Court of Appeals1 and the California Supreme Court.
2
46. See The National Observer, Sept. 22, 1969, at p. 2, col. 4.
47. Id.
1. 61 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1967).
2. 68 Cal. 2d 436, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421, 439 P.2d 333 (1968).
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The Supreme Court of the United States, per Mr. Justice Stewart, reversed.
Held, the warrantless search of defendant's entire three-bedroom house,
incident to a lawful arrest, is unreasonable as extending beyond defendant's per-
son and the area within which he might either obtain a weapon or destroy
evidence that could be used against him. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
The fourth amendment protects the individual against unreasonable searches
and seizures by requiring that searches must be made pursuant to a warrant
and that search warrants will be issued only when based on probable cause.
Items seized during an unreasonable search cannot be used as evidence against
the defendant at his trial in either a federal3 or state4 proceeding. In addition,
the fruits of such illegally seized items are similarly excluded from the evidence
at his trial.5 The function of a search warrant is to interpose a neutral magis-
trate between the police and the citizen; in each case, the magistrate determines
whether there is probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant. This
requirement acts as a deterrent to illegal police activity.6 Probable cause is
based on more than mere rumor or suspicion.7 There must be reliable and trust-
worthy information to convince a reasonably cautious man, the neutral magis-
trate, that the criminal evidence sought will be found at the place to be searched.8
The policeman must convince the magistrate of probable cause based upon reli-
able facts and underlying circumstances.9 The search warrant not only must
be based on probable cause but also must particularly describe "the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized."' 0 Before a warrant is issued
there must be sufficient evidence to show that the items sought are seizable.
That is, the official seeking the warrant must demonstrate that the items are
connected with criminal activity as either evidence of crime or contraband.
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
6. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); see also Note, 78 YALE L.J. 433
at 436-37 (1969); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1947).
7. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41
(1933).
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to
search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts
or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of
belief or suspicion is not enough.
290 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
8. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964). In Aguilar the affidavit contained the following:
Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe
that heroin, marijuana, barbituates and other narcotic paraphernalia are being
kept at the above described premises ....
378 U.S. at 109.
9. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 419 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 109
(1964). Probable cause for an arrest warrant also requires facts and circumstances based
upon reliable information but, in the arrest situation, the magistrate must be convinced
that a crime has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV; see also Comment, 28 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 664 (1961).
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Search warrants may be issued on the basis of information obtained by the
police from an informer. 1 In situations involving tips by informants, the official
seeking the search warrant must demonstrate the reliability of his informant
to the issuing magistrate. In addition, such official must indicate how his infor-
mant acquired the information.'
2
Although in most cases a search warrant is required to effect a reasonable
search, there are exceptions produced by special circumstances which enable
the police to perform a search without obtaining a warrant.' 8 The police do not
need a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of an individual who is believed
to have just committed a crime; taking time out at this point to secure a war-
rant might impede the apprehension of a criminal and endanger innocent by-
standers. 14 Similarly, motor vehicles may often be searched without a warrant
because they can easily be moved. Thus, the courts hold that it is not practical
to require the officers to take time out to obtain a warrant.15 Another exception
to the requirement that the police obtain a warrant before performing a search
is the "stop and frisk" situation' 6 which arises in the course of street encounters
between the police and the citizen and enables the police officer to intrude upon
the individual's freedom and make a limited search for weapons.' 7 Such a situa-
tion arises after the police officer observes conduct which leads him to reason-
ably believe that criminal activity is present and the suspect may be armed. In
order to protect himself and others in the vicinity, the police officer may pat
down the outer clothing of the suspect in a limited search for weapons.'8 The
most important exception to the search warrant requirement is the search per-
formed incident to a lawful arrest.
The concept of search incident to arrest was first established when the
Court recognized a right to search a person "to discover and seize the fruits or
evidences of crime."19 This right was later expanded to include the place "where
the arrest was made." 20 Subsequently, limitations were placed upon the scope
of the search. Searches incident to arrest were held invalid where the arresting
11. McCray v. fllinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
12. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
13. Border searches, authorized by statute, require neither a warrant nor probable
cause. These searches may be conducted on the basis of suspicion and the searches are
considered to be incident to crossing an international boundary. Witt v. United States, 287
F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961); see Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966); see
also, Comment, 10 A= . L. Rav. 457 (1968).
14. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
15. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see United States v. Bonanno, 180
F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But see People v. Watkins, 19 Inl. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433
(1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 833 (1960) wherein the Court reasoned that the nature of the
offense and surrounding circumstances must be taken into consideration in order to deter-
mine whether a search was reasonable.
16. N.Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRoC. § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1968).
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. Id. at 30.
19. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (dictum).
20. Agnello v. United States, 269 US. 20, 30 (1925) (dictum); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (dictum); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
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officer had the time and information sufficient to obtain a search warrant 21 and
where the arrest was used as a mere pretext to a search.22 When a particular
limitation would apply, however, remained unclear. Although the time limita-
tion was ignored in at least one subsequent case,23 it became the basis upon
which the Court invalidated the search in Trupiano v. United States.2 4 In that
case, the Court reasoned that the right to search incident to arrest grew out of
the necessities of the situation at the time of arrest. However, there must be
something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. Thus, if the
officer had time to secure a search warrant, there was no necessity to search
without a warrant. Recognizing that the time limitation was an inflexible crite-
rion upon which to test in retrospect the legality of a search, the Court in
United States v. Rabinowitz25 expressed disapproval of Trupiano and announced
a different criterion.
A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured
whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of
easy administration. But we cannot agree that this requirement should
be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search.
* * * The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a
search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. 20
Until Chimel v. California,27 the Rabinowitz test had been applied without
significant change or refinement.
28
In Chimel the Court indicates that the fourth amendment was a reaction
to the abuse inherent in both general and warrantless searches.29 Thus, the
amendment requires that, with exceptions noted above,80 a warrant must be
obtained before a search may legally be performed. The burden of fitting within
the exceptions is upon those who seek to search and seize without a warrant.
The warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest became an exception to the
warrant required by the fourth amendment, because of the emergency situation
presumably created by an arrest. The Court reasoned that when the arrest is
made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the arrestee in order to
remove any weapons that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or to
effect his escape.8 1 In addition, it is reasonable to search and seize any evidence
on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. Bal-
21. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
22. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
23. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
24. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
25. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
26. Id. at 65, 66.
27. Instant case at 761.
28. Compare Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217 (1960); and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), with Kremen v. United
States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957). See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
29. Instant case at 761.
30. See supra notes 14 to 18 and accompanying text.
31. Instant case at 763.
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ancing the evils of a warrantless search against the desirability and necessity
of a warrantless search when impelling circumstances exist, the Court arrived
at a narrowly defined area which may lawfully be searched without a warrant
incident to a lawful arrest. The same reasoning was applied in Terry v. Ohio3 2
wherein the Court stated that the police must obtain a warrant wherever prac-
tical and that the scope of a search must be tied to the circumstances which
rendered it permissible. Terry allowed no more than a limited protective search
-a patting down of the suspect's outer clothing for weapons. This principle
was followed in Sibron v. New York33 wherein the Court did not uphold the
search of petitioner's pockets because the officer was not searching for weapons.
Therefore, the protection of the police officer was not involved. Chimel uses a
similar analysis to delimit the proper extent of a search incident to an arrest.
The police can search the person arrested to remove weapons; they can search
and seize any evidence on defendant's person to prevent concealment or de-
struction thereof. In addition, they can search the area within which the arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidence (e.g. a table or drawer in
front of the arrestee). Thus, the area within defendant's immediate control is
defined as "the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence."3 4 In order to search in areas beyond the defendant's
reach the police must obtain a warrant. The Court rejects the argument'that
it is "reasonable" to search a man's home when he is arrested. Such reasonable-
ness merely relates to the convenience of performing such a search and to the
acceptability of certain police practices. Convenience, however, is not a deter-
minative factor.3 5 The dissent construed the facts of the instant case differently
and found that the search was reasonable3 6 on the ground there was "indepen-
dent probable cause."13 7 In addition, the dissent reasoned that where an arrest
occurs in an individual's home a search 'of the home should be permitted even
though no search warrant has been obtained; an emergency situation existed be-
cause Chimel's wife would have had an opportunity to destroy or remove the
evidence. Furthermore, the arrestee would have an opportunity for judicial
scrutiny of the search after the search through a motion to suppress any evi-
dence seized during the search.
After Chimel, an invasion of privacy in the form of a search of premises
will only be permitted when such search is performed pursuant to a search
32. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
34. Instant case at 763.
35. Id. at 763.
36. Id. at 783.
37. Mr. Justice White pointed out in his dissent that
[tlhere was doubtless probable cause not only to arrest petitioner, but to search
his house. He had obliquely admitted both to a neighbor, and to the owner of
the burglarized store, that he had committed the burglary. In light of this, and the
fact that the neighbor had seen. other admittedly' stolen property in petitioner's.
house, there was surely probable cause on which a warrant could have been issued
to search the house for the stolen coins. Instant case at 774-75.
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warrant. The Court has finally set forth a precise definition of the area which
can reasonably be searched incident to a lawful arrest. That is, only the area
within which the arrestee can gain access to weapons or evidence may now legally
be searched. Any broader search will require a warrant. The Court has stabilized
the scope of a search incident to an arrest which has previously been marked by
vague and inconsistent opinions.38 By specifically limiting the permissible scope
of such a search, the Court is deterring police abuse of an individual's right of
privacy. This limitation seems to be consistent with recent Supreme Court deci-
sions involving confessions, 9 "stop and frisk,"
40 informants, 41 wiretapping,42
and police detentions. 43 This restriction placed upon police in searching incident
to arrest could foster some changes in police practices. Rabinowtiz and Harris
gave policemen the opportunity to engage in searches not justified by probable
cause by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest the suspect at his home
rather than elsewhere. Under this permissive approach the police were also
able to arrest an individual on a minor charge, such as a traffic violation or a
vagrancy offense, and use the arrest "to justify a search for evidence of a more
serious crime."'44 Before a warrant will be issued authorizing the search of a
broader area than that which was set forth in Chimel, the. magistrate must be
convinced that probable cause exists for the search. It may be difficult to obtain
a search warrant because, under the Court's recent rulings,45 the officer must
show that the information upon which he is basing his belief in the existence of
probable cause is reliable and trustworthy. Before Chimel, the police would ar-
rest an individual for crime X and then search the place of arrest in the hope
of obtaining evidence of crime X. In addition, they may have arrested the in-
dividual for crime X but in the course of their search incident to that arrest the
arresting officers may have found evidence of crime Y. In either case, under the
Rabinowtiz test the search would probably be deemed reasonable. Therefore,
the evidence seized would be admissible at trial. The evidence that was discov-
ered in either of these situations would never have been discovered but
for the fact that an arrest occurred at that particular place. This type of
search does not seem to be consistent with the fourth amendment protection
against warrantless searches. By specifically limiting the search incident to ar-
rest, a system may develop whereby police obtain a search warrant (satisfying
all the requirements relating thereto), perform the search, seize the evidence
specified in the search warrant at the place specified in the search warrant, and
on the basis of the items seized obtain probable cause for arresting the defen-
38. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966).
40. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43. Davis v. Mississippi, 393 U.S. 821 (1969).
44. Comment, 69 CoLumh. L. Rzv. 866 at 877 (1969).
45. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964).
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dant for committing the crime relating to these items, and arrest the suspect.
This sequence of events would be entirely consistent with the fourth amend-
ment. Moreover, the system which may be promulgated is consistent with recent
Supreme Court decisions establishing definite and effective guidelines for police
activity including invasions of privacy (e.g. "stop and frisk" 46 and wiretapping
situations47). In all of these cases the Court is limiting the extent to which the
police can invade an individual's privacy without prior judicial approval. Since
"the number of searches made incident to arrest far surpasses the number of
searches made under authority of a search warrant,148 Chimel may have a pro-
found effect on police practices.
SusAN LEVENBERG
CRIMINAL LAW-ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING-STANDING TO OBJECT TO
THIR PARTY CONVERSATIONS
Petitioners, Alderman and Alderisio, were convicted of conspiring to trans-
mit murderous threats in interstate commerce in violation of federal law.' The
court of appeals affirmed their convictions,2 and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.8 On petition for rehearing, the petitioners alleged that they had
recently discovered that Alderisio's place of business had been the subject of
electronic surveillance by the Government. The Government denied that it had
intercepted any conversations relevant to the prosecution. 4 The Court, how-
ever, reading the Government's response as admitting that Alderisio's conver-
sations had been overheard by unlawful electronic surveillance, granted the
petition for rehearing, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the convictions
were tainted.5 Thereafter, the Government filed a motion to modify the order-
the record of such illegal surveillance should be inspected by the trial judge
in camera turning over to petitioners only those materials relevant to their
prosecution. Upon hearing argument on that motion, the Supreme Court agreed
to hear the case again.6 The Court further directed the parties to brief the
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48. Comment, 1966 U. Irx. L!F. 255 at 278.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 875(c) (1964).
2. Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967).
3. Kolod v. United States, 389 U.S. 834 (1967).
4. In its brief for reargument, the Government asserted that no electronic surveillance
was conducted at places owned by Alderisio, but rather was carried out only at premises
owned by his associates or by firms which employed him; that Alderisio himself did not
have desk space at the subject premises; and finally, that Alderman neither participated in
any of the recorded conversations nor had any interest in the premises where the conversa-
tions were recorded. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 168 n.1 (1969).
5. Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136 (1968).
6. Alderman v. United States, 392 U.S. 919 (1968).
